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Abstract
Ingroup favoritism, the tendency to favor ingroup over out-
group, is often explained as a product of intergroup conflict, or
correlations between group tags and behavior. Such accounts
assume that group membership is meaningful, whereas human
data show that ingroup favoritism occurs even when it confers
no advantage and groups are transparently arbitrary. Another
possibility is that ingroup favoritism arises due to perceptual
biases like outgroup homogeneity, the tendency for humans to
have greater difficulty distinguishing outgroup members than
ingroup ones. We present a prisoner’s dilemma model, where
individuals use Bayesian inference to learn how likely oth-
ers are to cooperate, and then act rationally to maximize ex-
pected utility. We show that, when such individuals exhibit
outgroup homogeneity bias, ingroup favoritism between arbi-
trary groups arises through direct reciprocity. However, this
outcome may be mitigated by: (1) raising the benefits of coop-
eration, (2) increasing population diversity, and (3) imposing a
more restrictive social structure.
Keywords: ingroup favoritism; outgroup homogeneity; direct
reciprocity; Bayesian learning; conditional expected utility
Introduction
Ingroup favoritism is the tendency for people to favor
members of their own group over members of other
groups. It manifests as a bias in how people evaluate oth-
ers (Brewer, 1979; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), distribute
rewards (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), mete out
punishments (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006), and de-
cide whether or not to cooperate (Dorrough, Glo¨ckner, Hell-
mann, & Ebert, 2015). Though readily elicited in both natu-
ral (Rand et al., 2009) and arbitrary groups (Efferson, Lalive,
& Fehr, 2008; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), the existence
of ingroup favoritism is puzzling. It often neither improves
the population’s average outcome, nor maximizes that of the
individual (Nakamura & Masuda, 2012). Disagreement even
exists as to whether ingroup favoritism is better understood as
a preference for improving the welfare of ingroup over out-
group, or as a product of divergent beliefs about how these
groups behave (Everett, Faber, & Crockett, 2015). However,
empirical work suggests that people generally expect ingroup
members to act in a cooperative manner (Brewer, 2008; Ya-
magishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999), and meta-analysis confirms
that this expectation is indeed stronger toward ingroup than
outgroup (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). A promising av-
enue for explaining ingroup favoritism therefore seems to be
understanding how people arrive at these beliefs. In short,
why are ingroup members seen as more cooperative than out-
group ones?
Many theoretical models have addressed this question.
One common approach is to assign phenotypic tags to indi-
viduals, and then see what is required to elicit ingroup fa-
voritism. Such models have shown that ingroup favoritism
may be selected for when tags are not arbitrary, but rather cor-
relate with behavioral traits (Jansen & van Baalen, 2006; Ma-
suda & Ohtsuki, 2007; Traulsen, 2008). These traits typically
include willingness to cooperate, or suitability as a cooper-
ative partner. Ingroup favoritism may thus occur when tags
convey information useful in guiding the individual’s own
actions. Other models explain ingroup favoritism as a prod-
uct of intergroup conflict (Choi & Bowles, 2007; Garcı´a &
van den Bergh, 2011; Konrad & Morath, 2012), where group
membership may be arbitrarily decided, but remains relevant
from a competitive point of view. However, a classic em-
pirical finding is that humans show ingroup favoritism even
when groups are both explicitly arbitrary and functionally ir-
relevant (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn,
1980). So why should ingroup favoritism occur even when
group membership is meaningless, and such outcomes are
maladaptive?
One explanation is that ingroup favoritism may arise
through cognitive or perceptual limitations (Masuda, 2012).
For instance, humans are known to perceive outgroup mem-
bers as more similar to one another than ingroup members, a
bias known as outgroup homogeneity (Judd & Park, 1988).
By approximating individuals’ characteristics through a sin-
gle group stereotype, this may serve to reduce cognitive bur-
den (Masuda, 2012). Masuda (2012) studied the implications
of such a bias on indirect reciprocity, where cooperation is
conditioned on whether or not partners maintain a good repu-
tation. In the simplest such scheme, an individual’s reputation
improves when it is observed to cooperate, and suffers when
it is observed to defect; in more complicated schemes, reputa-
tion may, for example, also be gained by being observed pun-
ishing a defector, or lost by being observed cooperating with
one. To simulate outgroup homogeneity, individuals were al-
lowed to observe accurate reputation information about in-
group members, but only group-level information about out-
group members. Ingroup favoritism occurred, but only when
additional assumptions were invoked, such as individuals us-
ing a different rule for attributing reputation to ingroup than
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to outgroup members. A follow-up model by Nakamura and
Masuda (2012) eliminated the need for such double stan-
dards, and also produced ingroup favoritism through indirect
reciprocity. However, this time the result was contingent on
reputation information being only shareable within groups,
but not between them.
Here, we show that complex rules for assigning and shar-
ing reputation are not needed to explain ingroup favoritism
between arbitrary groups. Rather, outgroup homogeneity
bias may drive ingroup favoritism through a much simpler
mechanism: direct reciprocity (learning through personal ex-
perience). We create an agent-based computational model,
where individuals are assigned arbitrary group tags, and then
play a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. These individuals use
Bayesian inference to learn how likely others are to cooper-
ate or defect, and then act rationally by maximizing their con-
ditional expected utility. We show that introducing outgroup
homogeneity bias into this minimal setting is sufficient to pro-
duce strong ingroup favoritism, and propose several ways of
mitigating this outcome.
Model
Prisoner’s Dilemma
We consider a PD game where pairs of neighboring individ-
uals interact by either cooperating (C) or defecting (D). The
game is parameterized by two values: the benefit of receiving
cooperation, b, and the cost of cooperating, c. When both in-
dividuals cooperate, both receive the benefit of cooperation,
but pay the cost of cooperating, b− c. If one individual de-
fects while the other cooperates, then the cooperator pays the
cost while receiving no benefit, −c, while the defector pays
no cost but receives the full benefit, b. When both individu-
als defect, neither receives the benefit nor pays the cost. The
following table summarizes the row player’s payoffs:
C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
As long as b > c > 0, each player’s payoff is always im-
proved by defecting, no matter what the other player does.
This makes the game a dilemma, because although the best
individual outcome is unilateral defection, the best average
outcome is mutual cooperation.
Social Structure
In PD, ingroup favoritism is operationalized as a higher
rate of cooperation toward ingroup partners than outgroup
ones (Dorrough et al., 2015; Fu et al., 2012; Gray et al., 2014;
Masuda, 2012). For ingroup favoritism to be possible, coop-
eration must also be possible. By constraining which individ-
uals interact, we promote repeat interactions, which in turn
promotes cooperation (Szabo´ & Fa´th, 2007). For each run,
we generate a random r-regular graph (Bolloba´s, 2001) with
1000 vertices, using Steger and Wormald’s (1999) algorithm.
Each vertex represents an individual, and each edge repre-
sents a connection between neighbors. This graph governs
interactions by limiting individuals to playing PD exclusively
with their neighbors.
Group Tags
Individuals are divided into m groups, where group member-
ship is represented by a tag visible to all other individuals.
By default, m = 2, though it may take other values, as long as
m > 1. Otherwise, tags cease to represent group membership,
and instead become a universally shared characteristic. Each
individual is randomly assigned a tag, such that each group
has the same initial number of members. When replacement
occurs, newcomers are assigned a tag uniformly at random.
Rational Bayesian Learning
Learning involves estimating a pair of parameters for each
partner i that the individual interacts with. The first parameter
pi represents the estimated probability that partner i will co-
operate with the individual, given that the individual cooper-
ates with that partner, Pr(Ci|C). The second parameter qi es-
timates the probability that partner i will cooperate, given that
the individual defects against that partner, Pr(Ci|D). Because
the game is simultaneous, actions cannot be conditioned on
those of the partner. However, there is no a priori reason
for individuals to know this, and indeed repeated interactions
cause pi and qi to diverge, as individuals change their be-
havior in response to that of their partner. Individuals use
Bayesian inference to arrive at point estimates for pi and qi.
Here, the posterior predictive distribution corresponds to the
posterior mean (Griffiths, Kalish, & Lewandowsky, 2008),
pi :=
nCC +α+1
nCC +nCD +α+β+2
qi :=
nDC +α+1
nDC +nDD +α+β+2
,
(1)
where nAB counts the number of times the individual took ac-
tion A when partner i took action B. Similarly, α and β are
pseudocounts (Griffiths et al., 2008) that encode prior knowl-
edge or expectations about the frequency of cooperation and
defection, respectively. These take the value α = β = 0,
which represents a neutral prior (uniform distribution), where
neither cooperation nor defection is seen as inherently more
likely.
By default, individuals maintain a pair of p and q values
for each partner i. However, individuals exhibiting outgroup
homogeneity bias do not distinguish between outgroup mem-
bers, so they instead track a single pair of values, p j and q j,
for each outgroup j. Outgroup homogeneity thus causes indi-
viduals to treat outgroups as if they were a single individual.
Individuals act rationally on their Bayesian estimates, so as
to maximize their conditional expected utility (Jeffrey, 1990).
More formally, an individual cooperates if
pb− c > qb, (2)
and defects otherwise. To give individuals a chance to sam-
ple both actions, we implement a small trembling-hand pa-
rameter (Selten, 1975). When an individual selects an action,
with a small probability ε= 0.01, it takes the opposite action
Figure 1: Ingroup and outgroup cooperation rates over time,
in the absence of outgroup homogeneity bias. Cooperation
rates climb rapidly as individuals learn that defection is met
with defection. Ingroup cooperation rates mirror outgroup
cooperation rates, because group membership is irrelevant.
instead. Removing this parameter (setting ε = 0) does not
qualitatively alter our results.
Simulation
At each time step, individuals interact with their neighbors
in random order. Interactions involve selecting an action (C
or D), and then playing PD. After each interaction, individu-
als note the outcome of the game, and then update their es-
timates p and q. Once everyone has finished playing, indi-
viduals are subjected to a 0.01 probability of being replaced.
Newcomers are assigned a group tag uniformly at random,
and have no knowledge of their predecessor’s p and q val-
ues. Because there is no selection over genotypes, ingroup
favoritism cannot evolve, but arises through phenotypic plas-
ticity (i.e. learning) instead. We run simulations for 1000
time steps, by which time cooperation rates have long stabi-
lized. All results are averaged across 20 independent runs,
and stabilized cooperation rates are further averaged over the
last 100 time steps. In all figures, line width represents 95%
confidence intervals.
Results
We first consider unbiased individuals, connected to r = 10
random neighbors, where the benefit of receiving coopera-
tion (b = 3) moderately exceeds the cost of giving it (c = 1).
In the first few time steps, cooperation rates are near-zero
(Figure 1). Recall that naı¨ve agents have a uniform prior,
meaning that cooperation and defection are seen as equally
likely. However, the expected utility of unilateral defection
is higher than that of mutual cooperation (Inequality 2), and
so virtually everyone defects, hoping to take advantage of a
cooperating partner. Individuals quickly learn that defection
Figure 2: Ingroup and outgroup cooperation rates over time,
with outgroup homogeneity bias. Here, individuals track out-
group members’ behavior at a group rather than individual
level. Breakdowns in cooperation result in cascades of de-
fection involving entire groups, rather than just the offending
individual, resulting in strong ingroup favoritism.
is met with defection, which lowers their estimate of q. With
unilateral cooperation seeming increasingly unlikely, qb falls
below pb− c, and individuals seek out mutual cooperation
instead. As cooperation is met with cooperation, estimates of
p increase, and high rates of cooperation (∼ 84%) are estab-
lished. Although individuals are assigned to m = 2 random
groups, group membership is irrelevant, and so ingroup and
outgroup cooperation rates do not differ.
When outgroup homogeneity bias is introduced, outgroup
members cease being treated as individuals, but as representa-
tives of their group. By generalizing the outcome of each in-
teraction to other members of the outgroup, individuals learn
that defection does not yield cooperation even more rapidly
than when playing against ingroup members. This causes an
initial spike in outgroup cooperation (Figure 2). However,
although ingroup cooperation is a bit slower to get going, it
alone persists. To understand why, consider what happens
when an individual cooperates, but its partner defects. If part-
ner i is an ingroup member, then the individual revises its
beliefs about that partner’s willingness to cooperate, and pi
declines. Soon, pb− c drops below qb, and the individual
ceases to cooperate. Once partner i learns that defection does
not evoke cooperation, its q falls low enough for it to also
seek mutual cooperation. Any successful instance of mutual
cooperation promotes further cooperation, causing p values
to increase, entrenching that behavior. However, if partner i is
an outgroup member, then the individual does not know who
to blame for the partner’s unilateral defection. The individual
thus revises its beliefs about the entire group’s willingness to
cooperate, and p j declines. This causes the individual to pun-
ish not just the defecting partner, but also any others from that
Figure 3: Stabilized ingroup and outgroup cooperation rates
for various benefit-to-cost (b/c) ratios. Increasing the b/c ra-
tio favors cooperation more broadly by making the temptation
to defect less appealing, thus reducing ingroup favoritism.
group. Those neighbors then punish the focal individual, as
well as members of its group, for this seemingly unprovoked
hostility. Intergroup defections thus bring about not just pun-
ishment of the offending individual, but also a cascade of re-
tributive defections. Outgroup cooperation is prohibitively
difficult to establish and maintain under such conditions, re-
sulting in strong ingroup favoritism.
We next consider various parameters that may mitigate this
outcome. For example, increasing the trembling-hand param-
eter ε reduces ingroup favoritism, albeit in a somewhat trivial
manner. The more errors individuals commit in taking their
desired action, the more this increases (unwanted) outgroup
cooperation and decreases (desirable) ingroup cooperation.
Such effects offer relatively little additional insight, however,
because ingroup favoritism is merely harder to enact, rather
than less sought after.
Of greater theoretical interest is the effect of increasing the
benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation. Doing so raises both in-
group and outgroup cooperation, which in turn reduces in-
group favoritism (Figure 3). Higher b/c ratios represent more
cooperative games, where mutual cooperation is more re-
warding, and the temptation to defect is reduced (i.e. Inequal-
ity 2 becomes primarily driven by p and q values, rather than
c). Whereas the ingroup cooperation rate rapidly approaches
a ceiling, the outgroup cooperation rate has more room to
grow.
Another parameter of interest is the number of groups, m.
This may be regarded as a measure of the population’s diver-
sity. Increasing the number of groups does not affect ingroup
cooperation, but increases outgroup cooperation, thus reduc-
ing ingroup favoritism (Figure 4). Intuitively, if an individ-
ual’s neighbors all belong to different groups, then tracking
these groups’ aggregate behavior is equivalent to tracking in-
Figure 4: Stabilized ingroup and outgroup cooperation rates
for various numbers of groups (m). Increasing population di-
versity reduces ingroup favoritism, because fewer neighbors
share the same outgroup. This limits the scope of breakdowns
in cooperation caused by outgroup homogeneity bias.
dividual behavior. The more diverse the population, the less
meaningful outgroup homogeneity is as an approximation.
More practically, when fewer neighbors share group member-
ship, breakdowns in cooperation result in smaller cascades of
retributive defections.
Finally, the number of neighbors that individuals interact
with, r, is also relevant. If there are relatively many groups
in the population (e.g. m = 20), then reducing the number
of neighbors alleviates cascading breakdowns in cooperation,
because fewer neighbors belong to the same group. This pro-
motes higher rates of outgroup cooperation, which in turn re-
duces ingroup favoritism (Figure 5). However, if there are
few groups (e.g. m = 2), outgroup cooperation remains un-
sustainable, even if the number of neighbors is drastically re-
duced (e.g. to r = 3), and ingroup favoritism remains high.
Discussion
We have presented an agent-based computational model of a
PD game, where outgroup homogeneity causes ingroup fa-
voritism between arbitrary groups. Previous models have re-
lied on indirect reciprocity (observing others’ interactions) to
produce such an outcome. However, these only produced
ingroup favoritism if they invoked additional factors. For
instance, Masuda (2012) found that reputation assignment
rules had to differ for ingroup and outgroup members, while
Nakamura and Masuda (2012) found that the flow of rep-
utation information had to be severed between groups. By
contrast, our model’s results are driven by direct reciprocity
(learning from personal experience), which obviates the need
for additional assumptions about how others’ interactions are
evaluated, or how that information is shared. The individu-
als we model leverage a minimal set of cognitive capacities.
Figure 5: Stabilized ingroup and outgroup cooperation rates
for various neighborhood sizes (r). If there are many groups
in the population (here m = 20), reducing the number of
neighbors reduces ingroup favoritism, by limiting the scope
of defection cascades.
Namely, they learn from past experience through Bayesian
inference, and make rational decisions by maximizing ex-
pected utility. In fact, they operate under similar assumptions
to those found in game theoretical “fictitious play” (Berger,
2007): They estimate others’ probability of cooperating as a
stationary strategy, and then select the best response to ob-
served behavior.
In our model, outgroup homogeneity causes ingroup fa-
voritism, because outgroup defections lower an entire group’s
perceived cooperativeness, rather than just the individual’s.
Outgroup cooperation is difficult to establish and maintain
not only because punishing a defector involves punishing
its entire group, but also because it triggers a cascade of
retributive action from those caught in the crossfire. Our
findings shed light on several empirical observations about
ingroup favoritism. For instance, ingroup favoritism is in-
famously easy to evoke even when it confers no advan-
tage, and group membership is transparently arbitrary (Billig
& Tajfel, 1973; Locksley et al., 1980). Moreover, meta-
analysis suggests that ingroup favoritism between transient,
experimentally-induced groups is often as strong as between
natural ones (Balliet et al., 2014). The fact that this is often
maladaptive from both the group and the individual’s point
of view makes it challenging to explain as a product of se-
lection (Nakamura & Masuda, 2012). In our model, indi-
viduals all share the same learning and decision rules, and
are assigned groups at random. There is no selection over
genotypes. Rather, strong ingroup favoritism arises rapidly
as a phenotypic consequence of Bayesian learning, rational
decision-making, and a well-established perceptual bias: out-
group homogeneity.
One implication is that reducing or eliminating outgroup
homogeneity bias may erode ingroup favoritism. In reality,
ingroup favoritism can be mitigated by taking the perspective
of outgroup members (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). The
apparent mechanism behind this result is that perspective-
taking reduces reliance on group stereotypes (Brewer, 1996),
causing outgroup members to be perceived as individuals.
Greater intergroup contact may also reduce intergroup bias,
both against that outgroup (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), as well
as against uninvolved others (Pettigrew, 2009). In line with
with our model’s predictions, this too appears to be driven by
reduced reliance on group stereotypes (Tadmor, Hong, Chao,
Wiruchnipawan, & Wang, 2012).
Similarly, ever since Sherif’s (1954) original Robbers Cave
experiment, ingroup favoritism has often been both evoked
and understood through the lens of competition (Sherif et
al., 1961). In the experiment’s final phase, intergroup ten-
sions were deliberately reduced by encouraging cooperation.
Consistent with this view, our model predicts that incentiviz-
ing cooperation alleviates ingroup favoritism. PD is a social
dilemma precisely because it rewards both competition and
cooperation. Increasing the b/c ratio thus minimizes these
competitive aspects, and emphasizes the cooperative ones in-
stead. Reducing the temptation to defect, relative to the ben-
efits of mutual cooperation, causes individuals to take more
risks to establish mutual cooperation, and to recover it more
readily when it breaks down.
Finally, our model also predicts that ingroup favoritism
may be reduced by increasing population diversity. When
fewer neighbors belong to the same group, this limits the
cascades of defection caused by outgroup homogeneity bias.
This is also why lowering the number of neighbors can be
effective. In both cases, the chances of being punished for
an ingroup member’s actions are reduced. However, this rea-
soning only applies if group membership is indeed arbitrary.
The role of diversity in ingroup favoritism is typically studied
through the lens of group differences, which add considerable
complexity (Everett et al., 2015). Similarly, if conflicts exist
along group lines, increased diversity may not necessarily re-
duce ingroup favoritism (Hewstone et al., 2014). No doubt,
a great deal of real-world ingroup favoritism is intertwined
with such pragmatic concerns. However, because ingroup fa-
voritism occurs even when such concerns are irrelevant, un-
derstanding such social factors could offer promising ways of
addressing it.
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